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Abstract. This paper deals with belief base revision that is a form of
belief change consisting of the incorporation of new facts into an agent’s
beliefs represented by a finite set of propositional formulas. In the aim
to guarantee more reliability and rationality for real applications while
performing revision, we propose the idea of credible belief base revision
yielding to define two new formula-based revision operators using the
suitable tools offered by evidence theory. These operators, uniformly pre-
sented in the same spirit of others in [9], stem from consistent subbases
maximal with respect to credibility instead of set inclusion and cardinal-
ity. Moreover, in between these two extremes operators, evidence theory
let us shed some light on a compromise operator avoiding losing initial
beliefs to the maximum extent possible. Its idea captures maximal consis-
tent sets stemming from all possible intersections of maximal consistent
subbases. An illustration of all these operators and a comparison with
others are inverstigated by examples.
Keywords: belief base revision · evidence theory · credibility · rational-
ity · knowledge representation and reasoning.
1 Introduction
One of the important research topics in Artificial Intelligence is dynamics (or
change) beliefs. In many applications, such as image processing, reliability expert
opinions, robotics, radar detection and relational databases, intelligent agents
face incomplete, uncertain and inaccurate information, and often need a revision
operation so as to manage their beliefs change in presence of a new and reliable
information. When this information contradicts the agent’s current beliefs, the
revision then deals with remaining consistency in order to integrate the new
information while modifying the initial beliefs as little as possible. During the
last thirty years, the question of how to perform revision gave rise to numerous
works according to the representation of beliefs.
The first works on the revision of beliefs come from subjective probabilities,
mainly with the works of Richard Jeffrey [21]. In this context, the beliefs of
an agent are represented by a measure of probability, and the beliefs revision
is what Jeffrey called probabilistic kinematics. Shortly thereafter, many logical
approaches to revision have been developed. Among these approaches, there are
the so-called syntactic approach [17,34,28,19,2] where a great importance was
given to revision of finite belief bases, i.e. finite propositional formulas sets. This
approach was formalized in terms of postulates (AGM postulates) [1] and sev-
eral operators have been proposed in the literature. Some of them are based
on construction of maximum consistent subbases according to different criteria
[3,10,22]. Recently, Creignou and colleagues in [9] focused particularly on two
operators, namely RSRG and RSRW, that are respectively similar to Ginsberg’s
one [17] and Widtio [34], using set cardinality instead of set inclusion as maxi-
mality criterion.
An important issue is to introduce efficient tools that fulfill the needs of
others in their investigations. Indeed, in many real applications, belief bases are
quite large and choosing, as a revision result, all maximal consistent subbases like
Ginsberg’s approach can be an expensive, exhaustive and even explosive solution.
On the one hand, keeping only beliefs that are not questioned (streeming from
the intersection of maximal coherent subbases) can be plausible strategy, but
not always reliable and can cause, in most the cases, a lot of loss of information
since there is no guarantee to not have the empty set as an intersection between
maximal consistent subbases. On the other hand, the selection of some maximal
consistent subbases according to determined criteria, can be shown also plausible,
and the choice of set cardinality like as in [9] seems rather reasonable, because
it respects the minimality change criterion of belief revision.
To deal with this issue and in order to be reliable and close to the non-
monotony of human reasoning mainly in the case of large belief bases, the selec-
tion of consistent subbases maximal with respect to set cardinality is not always
a guarantee to select the most relevant information and can consequently neglect
potential formulas from initial agent’s beliefs (as shown in Example 2). This pa-
per goes one step further in this context by investigating a more natural criterion
in the selection of consistent subbases respecting the minimality change criterion
of belief revision in the sense of credibility while performing change by captur-
ing the most valuable or potential information from initial beliefs. This can be
accomplished by using different tools offered by evidence theory, commonly also
known as Dempster-Shafer or belief functions theory [11,30].
To the best of our knowledge, although belief revision in probability theory is
fully studied, belief revision strategies in evidence theory has not been addressed
so far, except the paper [26] where authors have taken revision from a different
angle representing agent’s beliefs by mass functions in the aim to generalize Jef-
freys rule from probability to belief functions. In the present paper and from
another point of view to revision, we shed light on the use of evidence theory
in the context of formula-based belief revision through two main contributions.
Following the same spirit of the work [9], we propose at first two formula-based
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operators similar to RSRG and RSRW, namely CSRG and CSRW, based on the
selection of the most credible consistent subbases. The computation of credi-
bility is assured using the suitable tools offered by evidence theory. Then, we
present a new revision strategy instantiated by a compromise operator CSIR
between CSRG and CSRW. This strategy captures the most credible consistent
sets stemming from all the possible intersections of maximal consistent subbases.
It can supersede other strategies in many real applications for the reason that it
avoids losing original beliefs as far as possible. A compact representation of all
these operators is given within the unified framework already developed in [9].
This work is organized as follows: after a preliminary section (section 2)
which introduces some preliminaries on propositional logic and evidence theory
and gives a reminder on formula-based (syntactic) revision operators we are in-
terested in, we formally define in Section 3 our new belief operators stemming
from consistent subbases maximal with respect to credibility degree and we show
their specificities and advantages comparing with others. In section 4 we pro-
vide a new (compromise) revision strategy based likewise on credibility degree
capturing beliefs with a mind to be prudent. Both contributions are illustrated
with examples.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Propositional Logic
In this section, we assume familiarity with the basic notions of propositional
(classical) logic. So, we (very briefly) present the background and terminology
used in this paper. Let L be the language of propositional logic built on an infinite
countable set of variables (atoms) denoted by V and equipped with standard
connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →, the exclusive or connective ⊕, and constants ⊤, ⊥.
We remind that a literal a is an atom (positive literal) or the negation of an
atom ¬a (negative literal). A clause is a disjunction of literals. We say that a
formula is in CNF if it is a conjunction of clauses. For a set A of formulas,
Cn(A) denotes the closure of A under the consequence relation |=. A theory A
is a deductively closed set of formulas if A = Cn(A). Let B be a finite set of
propositional formulas, B = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕp} is identified to
∧
B the conjunction
of its formulas, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn. Given a family of finite sets of formulas
W = {B1, . . . , Bn}, we use
n∨
i=1
∧
Bi for
n∨
i=1
∧
ϕ∈Bi
ϕ.
2.2 Belief base revision
In this paper, we focus on formula-based (syntactic) revision operators already
presented within a unified framework in [9]. Each operator, denoted by ∗, is a
function that takes a belief base B and a formula µ representing new information
as input and returns a new belief base B∗µ. Many formula-based operators stem
from W(B, µ), the set of maximal subbases of B consistent with µ. They then
3
make use of this set to define the revised belief base according to a given strategy.
The maximality criterion as well as the strategy can vary. In the literature,
maximality was first considered in terms of set inclusion, and thus the following
set was considered
W⊆(B, µ) = {B
′
i ⊆ B |
∧
B′i 6|= ¬µ and for all B
′
j , j 6= i
s. t. B′i ⊂ B
′
j ⊆ B,
∧
B′j |= ¬µ}.
In [9], authors consider then two different strategies. The first one is ”per-
missive“ by considering that all maximal subbases are equally plausible and
the second one is more ”drastic“ and stems from the intersection of consistent
maximal subbases, i.e. it only keeps beliefs that are not questioned. Thus, these
two strategies provide two well-known operators, namely Ginsberg’s operator,
∗G, [17] and Widtio operator, ∗wid, [34] defined respectively as
B ∗G µ =
∨
B′∈W⊆(B,µ)
∧
(B′ ∪ {µ})
and
B ∗wid µ =
∧ ⋂
B′∈W⊆(B,µ)
(B′ ∪ {µ}).
Authors in [9] focus then on maximality defined in terms of cardinality. This
is a quite natural issue since in various applications the cardinality criterion is
used because information acquisition is expensive. So, they consider the set of
consistent subbases maximal w.r.t. cardinalityWcard(B, µ) instead ofW⊆(B, µ).
Formally, we present Wcard(B, µ) as
Wcard(B, µ) = {B
′
i ⊆ B |
∧
B′i 6|= ¬µ and for all B
′
j ⊆ B, j 6= i
s. t. |B′i| < |B
′
j |,
∧
B′j |= ¬µ}.
Analogously and respectively to Ginsberg’s and Widtio operators, the two
strategies presented above provide two operators RSRG [2] and RSRW. Indeed,
the notation RSR comes from the expression “Removed Sets Revision” qualifying
operators stemming from the removal of the smallest number of formulas from
the initial belief base [2]. Formally, we have
B ∗RSRG µ =
∨
B′∈Wcard(B,µ)
∧
(B′ ∪ {µ})
and
B ∗RSRW µ =
∧ ⋂
B′∈Wcard(B,µ)
B′ ∪ {µ}.
Moreover, note that these formula-based operators are sensitive to the syn-
tactic form of the knowledge representation. The following example illustrates
this idea.
4
Example 1. Consider B1 = {a, b}, B2 = {a, a → b} two belief bases and a
formula µ = ¬b representing the new information. The bases B1 and B2 are
equivalents. The unique subset ofB1 which is consistent with µ is {a}, while there
are two maximal (in terms of set inclusion) subsets of B2 which are consistent
with µ, namely, {a} and {a→ b}. Consequently, B1 ∗widµ = a∧¬b and B2∗widµ
= ¬b.
Therefore, in order to get rid of syntax dependency, Hansson [19] has shown
that it seems natural to revise explicitly defined belief bases and to then extend
these operations to belief sets, considering the deductive closure of the result of
revision. Otherwise, it is possible to define, from a revision operator ∗, a new
one denoted by ⊛ whose the result is a set of beliefs (or theory) such as
B ⊛ µ = Cn(B ∗ µ).
We adopt this point of view in the present paper and we obtain correspondingly
the following operators.
B ⊛G µ = Cn(
∨
B′∈W⊆(B,µ)
∧
B′ ∪ {µ})
B ⊛wid µ = Cn(
∧ ⋂
B′∈W⊆(B,µ)
{B′ ∪ {µ}})
B ⊛RSRG µ = Cn(
∧ ∨
B′∈Wcard(B,µ)
∧
B′ ∪ {µ})
B ⊛RSRW µ = Cn(
⋂
B′∈Wcard(B,µ)
{B′ ∪ {µ}})
2.3 Evidence theory
Evidence theory has been considered as a convenient framework dealing with
imperfect information. It was initially introduced by Arthur Dempster in 1967
[11] and then formalized by Glenn Shafer in 1976 [30] as a generalization of
subjective probability theory. It has been the starting point of several theoret-
ical developments especially the transferable belief model [33]. In addition, it
has been applied in several fields such as artificial intelligence [4,35], clustering
[27,13], multicriteria decision aid [6,7,8], etc.
Let Θ = {S1, ..., Sn} be a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
statements called frame of discernment and 2Θ be the power set of Θ. A Basic
Belief Assignment (BBA) [30] is the basic function used in evidence theory for
modeling imperfect data. It is a mapping m defined from 2Θ to [0, 1] such as
m{∅} = 0 and
∑
A⊆Θm(A) = 1. The quantity m(A) represents the belief mass
of subset A, i.e., the belief committed exactly to A. When m(A) 6= 0, A is called
a focal element or a focal set.
The function m constitutes a flexible tool in evidence theory that models
every state of belief. A BBA is said to be Bayesian if all its focal elements are
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singletons and consonant if all these elements are nested. It is called vacuous
if the total belief is assigned only to Θ (total ignorance case) and simple if it
has two focal elements and Θ is one of these focal sets. In the latter case, m(Θ)
reflects an ignorance level since it is the belief mass which is not assigned to any
subset A 6= Θ and transferred to Θ.
A BBA can be also represented by two functions called credibility (or be-
lief) and plausibility, denoted in the literature respectively by Bel and Pl [30].
Formally, these two functions are defined from 2Θ to [0, 1] as follows:
Bel(A) =
∑
X⊆A
X 6=∅
m(X)
Pl(A) =
∑
A∩X 6=∅
m(X)
Bel(A) is the total belief of subsets X which are included in A whereas
Pl(A) is the total belief of subsets X having a non-empty intersection with A,
i.e., the subsets that are included in A and those having a partial intersection
with A. Bel(A) and Pl(A) are therefore the minimal and maximal total beliefs
committed to A. They are also connected by the relation Pl(A) = 1 − Bel(A)
where A is the complement of A in Θ.
The combination is a fundamental notion in evidence theory allowing the
aggregation of imperfect information given by several sources and modeled by
BBAs. Several combination rules have been developed in this context [32,12,25].
Among them, Dempster’s rule [30] remains the most commonly-used operator
in the combination of independent BBAs. It is given by
m(A) = (1− k)−1.
∑
X∩Y=A
m1(X).m2(Y ),
where m = m1 ⊕m2 is the BBA deduced from the combination of m1 and m2
(called orthogonal sum) and k =
∑
X∩Y=∅m1(X).m2(Y ) is the belief mass that
the combination assigns to the empty set. The ratio (1−k)−1 is a normalization
factor guarantying that no belief mass is given to the empty set and that the
total belief is equal to one.
Dempster’s rule is a conjunctive operator, i.e., the resulting focal elements
are intersections of those related to m1 and m2. It can be proved to be both
commutative and associative. Thus, the combination result of several BBAs is
independent of the order in which they are considered.
The decision-making is also an important notion of evidence theory that
aims to choose the ”best” statement of Θ. Among other rules, one can cite the
maximum of credibility rule that selects the most credible Si [14], the maximum
of plausibility rule that chooses the most plausible Si [14], and the maximum of
pignistic probability [31]. The latter operator is based on the idea of transforming
a BBA into a function having similar properties of a probability distribution
called pignistic probability function BetP . The decision is therefore to choose
the statement having the maximum of pignistic probability.
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3 Credible belief base revision
In this section, we investigate the idea of belief base revision considering max-
imality in terms of set credibility (instead of set inclusion and set cardinality)
denoted throughout this paper by CSR (Credible Sets Revision). Recall that our
goal is to define belief base revision operators requiring rationality when revising
so as to avoid losing valuable beliefs.
3.1 Credible belief operators
As described hereafter, the credible belief base revision leads to define two new
formula-based revision operators using the suitable tools offered by evidence
theory. To ensure uniformity with the RSRG and RSRW operators, we denote
these operators by CSRG (referring to the permissive strategy) and CSRW (re-
ferring to the drastic strategy) that stem from WBel(B, µ), the set of consistent
subbases maximal w.r.t. credibility. Formally, we have
WBel(B, µ) = {B
′
i ⊆ B |
∧
B′i 6|= ¬µ and for all B
′
j ⊆ B, j 6= i
s. t. Bel(B′i) < Bel(B
′
j),
∧
B′j |= ¬µ}.
Let us turn to explain the computation of the credibility degree of each
maximal consistent subbase Bel(B′i). As presented below, the CSRG and CSRW
operators work in three major steps: the definition of BBAs, the combination
and the decision-making.
Indeed, starting from W(B, µ) (i.e., the set of maximal consistent subbases
B′i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the first step consists in representing each B
′
i by a simple
BBA denoted mi. This function takes into account the cardinality of B
′
i in order
to reflect its importance with regard to the other subbases and compared to the
initial agent’s belief base B. Formally, this BBA is given for each B′i as follows:{
mi(B
′
i) =
|B′i|
|B|
mi(B) = 1−
|B′i|
|B|
where |B′i| is the cardinality of B
′
i and |B| is the cardinality of B. As one can re-
mark, mi(B
′
i) represents the proportion of formulas belonging to B
′
i with regard
to B. Note also that mi(B) is interpreted as an ignorance level that reflects the
belief mass which is not assigned to B′i and therefore transferred to B.
In the second step, the BBAs describing the maximal coherent subbases are
combined using Dempster’s rule. The combined BBA is defined as the orthogonal
sum of these BBAs. It is given formally by :
m = m1 ⊕ ...⊕mn
Since Dempster’s rule is a conjunctive operator and the focal elements mi of
each BBA are B′i and B, the focal sets F(B, µ) of m (the combined BBA) are
7
therefore all the subbasesB′i, all the sets derived from their possible combinations
(non-empty intersections) denoted by F∩(B, µ) and the initial base B. This is
due to the fact that B is a common focal element defined in each mi. Thus, it
is clear that B plays a central role in the combination since it allows appearing
all the B′i and their potential intersections. The sets F(B, µ) and F∩(B, µ) are
formally defined respectively as follows:
F(B, µ) =W(B, µ) ∪ F∩(B, µ) ∪ {B}
F∩(B, µ) = {
⋂
i,j∈{1,..n}
(B′i, B
′
j) ∪
⋂
i,j,k∈{1,..n}
(B′i, B
′
j , B
′
k)
∪... ∪
⋂
(B′1, ..., B
′
n)} \ {∅}
At this point, let us note that the combination allows deducing intersections
of subbases with belief masses. If an intersection (or several) supports completely
a subbase B′i, it is therefore a focal set affirming B
′
i. Thus, its belief mass can
be added to m(B′i) which allows obtaining an overall degree characterizing B
′
i.
This measure is nothing else than its credibility degree Bel(B′i). Formally, we
have
Bel(B′i) = m(B
′
i) +
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X).
In the last step, the credibility degrees of all the B′i are exploited for the
decision. Remind that WBel(B, µ) will contain the most credible consistent sub-
bases among all the B′i of W(B, µ). Hence, the CSRG operator ∗CSRG takes
into account all the subbases in WBel(B, µ) considering them equally fair and
favorable. This operator can be captured as follows:
B ∗CSRG µ =
∨
B
′∗∈WBel (B,µ)
∧
(B
′∗ ∪ {µ})
As for the CSRW operator ∗CSRW, it stems from the intersection of the most
credible consistent subbases. The CSRW operator ∗CSRW can be defined as
B ∗CSRW µ =
∧ ⋂
B
′∗∈WBel(B,µ)
B
′∗ ∪ {µ}.
Consequently, the associated operators ⊛CSRG ⊛CSRW (returning a theory)
respectively to ∗CSRG and ∗CSRW are the following:
B ⊛CSRG µ = Cn(
∧ ∨
B
′∗∈WBel(B,µ)
∧
B
′∗ ∪ {µ})
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B ⊛CSRW µ = Cn(
⋂
B
′∗∈WBel(B,µ)
{B
′∗ ∪ {µ}})
We can now define the notion of logical consequence in each of these for-
malisms. A formula ψ is a logical consequence of the revision result B ∗ µ if:
– In the case of CSRG operator, it is a logical consequence of each subbase B′i
in WBel(B, µ) augmented with the new information µ. Formally, we have
B ∗CSRG µ |= ψ if and only if for each B′i ∈ WBel(B, µ), B
′
i ∪ {µ} |= ψ.
– In the case of CSRW operator, it is a logical consequence of the intersection of
all subbases inWBel(B, µ) augmented with the new information µ. Formally,
we have
B ∗CSRW µ |= ψ if and only if (
∧⋂
B′
i
∈WBel (B,µ)
B′i) ∪ {µ} |= ψ
As far, we can conclude that an interpretation I is a model of the revised
belief base (I |= B ∗ µ) if and only if I satisfies µ and satisfies at least one set
of WBel(B, µ) in the case of CSRG operator, and every formula occurring in all
maximal consistent subbases (i.e., in all sets ofWBel(B, µ)) in the case of CSRW
operator.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the maximum of credibility is generally
used within evidence theory to select the most credible element of the frame
of discernment. In this work, we have adapted the use of this rule according
to the studied context since the objective is not to select one formula from the
initial set B 4. The decision should rather be taken on the different subbases
(which are subsets of formulas) not on the formulas composing B. In addition,
it is important to notice that we have not hope to investigate the maximum of
plausibility in the context of CSRG and CSRW operators since the plausibility
considers even the focal elements having a partial intersection with B′i. These
focal elements are not the results of combining B′i with other subbases. They
are rather induced by the combination of other sets. Similarly, the maximum
of pignistic probability (basically used to select the most likelihood element of
the frame of discernment) is inappropriate in our context. Indeed, the pignistic
transformation cannot be exploited correctly in this case since the objective is
to select a maximal consistent subbase not a unique formula of B.
4
B constitutes the frame of discernment and the formulas are the statements.
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3.2 Illustration of CSRG and CSRW operators
In what follows, we provide a simple example illustrating the CSRG and the
CSRW operators.
Example 2. Consider the belief base B = {a→ ¬b,¬b → c, a → d, a→ ¬c, a →
¬d, b, a → b, a → e,¬b → e}, and a new information µ = a ∧ (b ←→ e). So, we
have
W(B, µ) = {B′1 = {a→ ¬b,¬b→ c, a→ d};
B′2 = {a→ ¬b, a→ ¬c, a→ d};
B′3 = {a→ ¬b, a→ ¬d};
B′4 = {b, a→ b, a→ e,¬b→ e}}.
It is clear that Wcard(B, µ) = {B′4 = {b, a→ b, a→ e,¬b→ e}}. Therefore,
B ∗RSRG µ = b ∧ (a→ b) ∧ (a→ e) ∧ (¬b→ e) ∧ (a ∧ (b←→ e)) =⊥ .
As Wcard(B, µ) contains a unique set (i.e. B
′
4), we have⋂
B′∈Wcard(B,µ)
B′ = {{b, a→ b, a→ e,¬b→ e}}.
Therefore, B ∗RSRW µ = B ∗RSRG µ =⊥ . Consequently, we obtain
B ⊛RSRG µ = B ⊛RSRW µ = Cn(⊥).
Let us now consider the CSRG and CSRW operators. Thus, we determine at
first the BBA related to each subbase B′i (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) as follows:{
m1(B
′
1) = 3/9
m1(B) = 6/9
{
m2(B
′
2) = 3/9
m2(B) = 6/9
{
m3(B
′
3) = 2/9
m3(B) = 7/9
{
m4(B
′
4) = 4/9
m4(B) = 5/9
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Dempster’s rule is then applied to combine m1, m2, m3 and m4. This leads to
the following BBA:

m(B′1) = 0.1354
m(B′2) = 0.1354
m(B′3) = 0.0774
m(B′4) = 0.2166
m({a→ ¬b, a→ d}) = m(B′1 ∩B
′
2) = 0.0677
m({a→ ¬b}) = m(B′1 ∩B
′
3) +m(B
′
2 ∩B
′
3) +m(B
′
1 ∩B
′
2 ∩B
′
3)
= 0.0967
m(B) = 0.2708
Based on the combined BBA, we compute the credibility degree Bel for
each subbase B′i. Since Dempster’s rule allows appearing the focal element {a→
¬b, a→ d} which is common between B′1 and B
′
2, m({a→ ¬b, a→ d}) should be
considered in the computation of the credibility degrees Bel(B′1) and Bel(B
′
2).
Similarly, since the focal element {a→ ¬b} is common between B′1, B
′
2 and B
′
3,
m({a→ ¬b}) should be also added to the credibility degrees Bel(B′1), Bel(B
′
2)
and Bel(B′3). As a result, we obtain the following values:

Bel(B′1) = m(B
′
1) +m({a→ ¬b, a→ d}) +m({a→ ¬b})
= 0.1354 + 0.0677 + 0.0967 = 0.2998
Bel(B′2) = m(B
′
2) +m({a→ ¬b, a→ d})m({a→ ¬b})
= 0.1354 + 0.0677 + 0.0967 = 0.2998
Bel(B′3) = m(B
′
3) +m({a→ ¬b}) = 0.0774 + 0.0967 = 0.1741
Bel(B′4) = m(B
′
4) = 0.2166
This yields to have
WBel(B, µ) = {{B
′
1 = {a→ ¬b,¬b→ c, a→ d};
B′2 = {a→ ¬b, a→ ¬c, a→ d}}.
Observe that WBel(B, µ) 6= Wcard(B, µ) and a fortiori neither B ∗CSRG µ 6=
B ∗RSRG µ, nor B ∗CSRW µ 6= B ∗RSRW µ. As a consequence,
B ∗CSRG µ = (((a→ ¬b) ∧ (¬b→ c) ∧ (a→ d)) ∨ ((a→ ¬b) ∧ (a→ ¬c)
∧(a→ d))) ∧ (a ∧ (b←→ e))
= a ∧ ¬b ∧ d ∧ e.
Hence, B ⊛CSRG µ = Cn(a ∧ ¬b ∧ d ∧ e). Furthermore, we have⋂
B
′∗∈WBel(B,µ)
B
′∗ = {{a→ ¬b, a→ d}}.
Therefore, B ∗CSRW µ = (a → ¬b) ∧ (a → d) ∧ (a ∧ (b ←→ e)) = a ∧ d ∧ e.
Consequently, we obtain B ⊛CSRW µ = Cn(a ∧ d ∧ e).
As one can remark, the subbase B′4 was not considered in the belief revision
outcome using the CSRG operator although it has the maximal cardinality with
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regard to B′1 and B
′
2. This is due to the fact that it is less credible than the other
subbases. This result can be explained by the lack of (a → ¬b) and (a → d) in
B′4 which are pertinent formulas in B giving a considerable advantage to B
′
1 and
B′2 and involving a loss of credibility of B
′
4 in favor of these subsets.
This example illustrates properly the fact that the selection of consistent
subbases maximal with respect to set cardinality is not always a guarantee to
select the most relevant information since it can neglect potential formulas from
the initial agent’s beliefs and thus it can induce a loss of rationality when revis-
ing. Additionally, the use of credibility in belief base revision seems reasonable
complying with the minimality (not in terms of quantity) criterion of belief revi-
sion through capturing relevant information playing a central role in the initial
agent’s beliefs. Hence, this credibility criterion can be interpreted as a way to
guard as possible as far the general sense of the agent beliefs. So, it would be
interesting to study to which extend the credible revision takes the form of syn-
tactic revision, implicitly with some semantic features.
The example presented above can be a proper illustration of the gap between
cardinality and credibility as maximality criteria in the selection of consistent
subbases. But this cannot deny the fact that the CSRG and RSRG operators
can lead to the same revision outcome in some cases.
Proposition 1. The CSRG operator leads to the same revision result as the
RSRG operator if and only if the combined BBA verifies the following two con-
ditions:
– ∀B′i, B
′
j ∈ WBel(B, µ):

m(B′i) = m(B
′
j)∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X) =
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)
– ∀B′i ∈ WBel(B, µ) and ∀B
′
j /∈ WBel(B, µ):
m(B′i)−m(B
′
j) > max

0,
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)−
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)


Proof. As stressed above, the subbases B′i appear in the combined BBA thanks
to the successive intersections with B. Moreover, since mi(B
′
i) is defined with
respect to its cardinality |B′i| (i.e. mi(B
′
i) =
|B′i|
|B| ), the successive combinations of
B′i with B using Dempster’s rule lead to obtain an order between the combined
belief masses m(B′i) that respects the order between the cardinalities |B
′
i|. As a
result: {
|B′i| = |B
′
j | ⇔ m(B
′
i) = m(B
′
j)
|B′i| > |B
′
j | ⇔ m(B
′
i) > m(B
′
j)
If the CSRG and RSRG operators reach the same revision result, this means
that WBel(B, µ) =Wcard(B, µ). Therefore:
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– ∀B′i, B
′
j ∈ WBel(B, µ): {
|B′i| = |B
′
j |
Bel(B′i) = Bel(B
′
j)
⇔


m(B′i) = m(B
′
j)
m(B′i) +
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X) = m(B′j) +
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)
⇔


m(B′i) = m(B
′
j)∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X) =
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)
– ∀B′i ∈ WBel(B, µ) and ∀B
′
j /∈ WBel(B, µ):{
|B′i| > |B
′
j |
Bel(B′i) > Bel(B
′
j)
⇔


m(B′i) > m(B
′
j)
m(B′i) +
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X) > m(B′j) +
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)
⇔


m(B′i)−m(B
′
j) > 0
m(B′i)−m(B
′
j) >
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)−
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)
⇔ m(B′i)−m(B
′
j) > max

0,
∑
X⊂B′j
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)−
∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X)


Remark 1. Let us emphasize that if the intersection of each pair of subbases is
the empty set, the CSRG and RSRG operators lead to the same revision result.
Indeed, if it is the case, the intersection of any other group of subbases is also the
empty set. As a result, the focal elements set of the combined BBA consists only
of the subbases (without intersections). This implies that there is no intersection
supporting totally B′i, i.e.: ∑
X⊂B′i
X∈F∩(B,µ)
m(X) = 0
Therefore, Bel(B′i) = m(B
′
i) and as a consequence, the revision result of the
CSRG operator can be defined as follows:
– ∀B′i, B
′
j ∈ WBel(B, µ):
Bel(B′i) = Bel(B
′
j)⇔ m(B
′
i) = m(B
′
j)
– ∀B′i ∈ WBel(B, µ) and ∀B
′
j /∈ WBel(B, µ):
Bel(B′i) > Bel(B
′
j)⇔ m(B
′
i) > m(B
′
j)⇔ m(B
′
i)−m(B
′
j) > 0
These two conditions are nothing else than the conditions exposed in Proposition
1. Hence, the CSRG and RSRG operators lead to the same revision result.
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4 Compromise revision strategy
In addition to the CSRG and CSRW operators, we present hereunder another
contribution that explores the idea of using evidence theory in belief base revi-
sion. More specifically, we propose a new revision strategy based on this theory
that captures beliefs with a mind to be prudent.
4.1 Description of compromise strategy
As explained previously, we have already provoked two extreme approaches for
revising belief bases. The former is permissive and allows choosing all the max-
imal consistent subbases whereas the latter is drastic leading to keep only the
beliefs that are not questioned. Between these two extremes, evidence theory let
us shed some light on the idea of an intermediary or a compromise strategy. The
underlying idea of this approach is to capture the maximal consistent sets stem-
ming from all the possible intersections of maximal consistent subbases. This
constitutes obviously an advantage with regard to the drastic strategy which
has been intensively criticized in the literature since it is so prudent and can
lead in many cases, and particularly with large belief bases, to lose all the initial
belief’s agents. In addition, it presents a benefit for the compromise strategy
compared to the permissive approach which can lead to an exhaustive revision
result especially in the domain of databases repair.
Considering the credibility as the most rational and reliable maximality crite-
rion, we focus on defining a compromise operator between the CSRG and CSRW
ones. The proposed operator, called CSIR (Credible Sets Intersections Revision),
is also based on the idea of using the information given by the combined BBA
since Dempster’s rule allows deducing all the possible intersections between the
subbases with their related belief masses. More precisely, the CSIR operator
stems from VBel(B, µ), the set of the most credible focal sets derived from all
the possible intersections of maximal consistent subbases B′i. In other words,
VBel(B, µ) selects from F∩(B, µ) the sets having the highest credibility degree.
At this point, let us note that the maximum of credibility implies implicitly the
satisfaction of maximal set inclusion criterion in VBel(B, µ). Formally, we obtain
VBel(B, µ) = {X
′
i ⊆ F∩(B, µ) |
∧
X ′i 6|= ¬µ and for all X
′
j ⊆ F∩(B, µ), j 6= i
s. t. Bel(X ′i) < Bel(X
′
j),
∧
X ′j |= ¬µ}.
The operator ∗CSIR is therefore defined as follows:
B ∗CSIR µ =
∨
X
′∗∈VBel(B,µ)
∧
(X
′∗ ∪ {µ})
and the associated operator ⊛CSRG returning a theory is captured by
B ⊛CSIR µ = Cn(
∧ ∨
X
′∗∈VBel(B,µ)
∧
X
′∗ ∪ {µ}).
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A formula ψ is a logical consequence of the revision result B ∗CSIR µ if it
is a logical consequence of each set X ′ in VBel(B, µ) augmented with the new
information µ. Formally, we have
B ∗CSIR µ |= ψ if and only if for each X ′ ∈ VBel(B, µ), X ′ ∪ {µ} |= ψ.
As far, we can conclude also that in the case of the CSIR operator, an inter-
pretation I is a model of the revised belief base (i.e. I |= B ∗ µ) if and only if
I satisfies µ and satisfies every formula occurring in each maximal (w.r.t. cred-
ibility) consistent set derived from all subbases intersections (i.e. in each set of
VBel(B, µ)).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that if B′i ∩B
′
j = ∅ for all B
′
i, B
′
j ∈ W(B, µ),
thus F∩(B, µ) = ∅ and therefore B ∗CSIR µ = µ. This obvious result can be
explained due to the conflicting character of each pair of subbases. Contrary to
the drastic approach (Widtio, RSRW and CSRW operators), this case constitutes
the unique situation where the compromise strategy (and particularly the CSIR
operator) loses all the original beliefs. That is why, it would be also interesting to
study other compromise operators complying with cardinality and set inclusion
criteria.
4.2 Illustration of CSIR operator
We show, in the following example, how compromise strategy and particularly
the CSIR operator can be attractive compared to the drastic strategy.
Example 3. Let B a belief base such that B = {a→ ¬b, c→ ¬a,¬d → ¬a, b →
c, b, a→ ¬d, d→ e, c→ e, b→ d, d→ c} and a new information µ = a ∧ ¬e.
We have
W(B, µ) = {B′1 = {a→ ¬b, c→ ¬a,¬d→ ¬a, b→ c};
B′2 = {b, a→ ¬d, d→ e, c→ e};
B′3 = {a→ ¬b, b→ d, d→ c}
B′4 = {b, b→ d, d→ c}}
and
Wcard(B, µ) = {B
′
1 = {a→ ¬b, c→ ¬a,¬d→ ¬a, b→ c};
B′2 = {b, a→ ¬d, d→ e, c→ e}}.
Let us compute WBel(B, µ) and VBel(B, µ). It is obvious that
F∩(B, µ) = {X
′
1 = {a→ ¬b}, X
′
2 = {b}, X
′
3 = {b→ d, d→ c}}.
The BBAs related to all the subbases are at first determined as follows:{
m1(B
′
1) = 4/10
m1(B) = 6/10
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{
m2(B
′
2) = 4/10
m2(B) = 6/10{
m3(B
′
3) = 3/10
m3(B) = 7/10{
m4(B
′
4) = 3/10
m4(B) = 7/10
Dempster’s rule is then used to combine these BBAs. The resulting BBA is
the following: 

m(B′1) = 0.169
m(B′2) = 0.169
m(B′3) = 0.1086
m(B′4) = 0.1086
m(X ′1) = 0.0724
m(X ′2) = 0.0724
m(X ′3) = 0.0466
m(B) = 0.2534
Finally, the credibility degrees of the maximal credible consistent subbases
and the credibility degrees of their possible intersections are computed based on
the combined BBA as below.

Bel(B′1) = m(B
′
1) +m(X
′
1) = 0.2414
Bel(B′2) = m(B
′
2) +m(X
′
2) = 0.2414
Bel(B′3) = m(B
′
3) +m(X
′
1) +m(X
′
3) = 0.2276
Bel(B′4) = m(B
′
4) +m(X
′
2) +m(X
′
3) = 0.2276
Bel(X ′1) = m(X
′
1) = 0.0724
Bel(X ′2) = m(X
′
2) = 0.0724
Bel(X ′3) = m(X
′
3) = 0.0466
This let us to have
WBel(B, µ) = {B
′
1 = {a→ ¬b, c→ ¬a,¬d→ ¬a, b→ c};
B′2 = {b, a→ ¬d, d→ e, c→ e}}.
Once again, remark that although the set X ′3 has the highest cardinality in
comparison with X ′1 and X
′
2, the above computation yields to have
VBel(B, µ) = {X
′
1 = {a→ ¬b}, X
′
2 = {b}}.
Turn us now to compute revision result with different operators. Observe
that ⋂
B′
i
∈W(B,µ)
B′i =
⋂
B′
i
∈Wcard(B,µ)
B′i =
⋂
B′
i
∈WBel (B,µ)
B′i = ∅
and so that we lose all initial beliefs taking into account the drastic strategy.
Formally, we obtain B ∗wid µ = B ∗RSRW µ = B ∗CSRW µ = µ and trivially
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B ⊛wid µ = B ⊛RSRW µ = B ⊛CSRW µ = Cn(µ). Nonetheless, the compromise
strategy avoids falling down in a similar result.
B ∗CSIR µ = ((a→ ¬b) ∨ b) ∧ µ.
This yields automatically B⊛CSIR µ = Cn(((a→ ¬b)∨ b)∧µ). It can be clearly
seen that CSIR operator behaves in a careful way as expected.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the current line of research in belief change that has
received considerable attention from the AI, database and philosophy commu-
nities. In these contexts, revision is considered as the well-known belief change
operation remaining consistency in order to integrate the new information while
modifying the initial beliefs as little as possible. As far as we know, revision
strategies in evidence theory have seldom been addressed. As shown previously,
our work deals with the use of evidence theory in belief base revision that was
investigated through two extreme revision operators (CSRG and CSRW respec-
tively similar to RSRG and RSRW) and a new compromise revision strategy
explicitly instantiated by CSIR operator. In both contributions, we highlighted
the potential benefit offered by the different tools of evidence theory in belief
base revision. Indeed, the notion of BBA was used to model the information
related to each subbase. Dempster’s rule was also applied to combine all these
BBAs in order to yield a global BBA synthetizing the information given by
the subbases set. In addition, the credibility maximality was used as a selection
criterion to choose the most credible subbases (CSRG and CSRW) or credible
subbases intersections (CSIR) instead of cardinality criterion. The presented ex-
amples illustrated to which extend the credibility criterion is interesting to avoid
losing valuable and relavant beliefs. Let us mention that we can define systemat-
ically two other compromise operators in the same spirit of CSIR operator: the
former RSIR (Removed sets intersections revision) is an intermediary between
RSRG and RSRW operators respecting the cardinality as maximality criterion
and the latter SIR is an intermediary between Ginsberg and Widtio operators
respecting the set inclusion as maximality criterion.
Belief revision and belief contraction are two sides of a same coin. In fact,
unlike belief revision, which allows to incorporate new information into a set
of beliefs, belief contraction is the process of rationally removing a given belief
from a belief set. It ensures removing from the set what is necessary to no longer
imply this information while respecting the principle of minimality of change.
Belief contraction is related to belief revision in the sense that belief revision
can be defined in term of contraction, that is to say, revising a belief set by new
information amounts to first remove from the belief set any belief contradicting
the new information, and then to add the new information. Formally, from the
works of Levi [23,24] and Harper [20], the correspondence between belief revision
and belief contraction has been established in [1], thus providing a useful equiv-
alence for belief change studies. Since then, different concepts and constructions
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have undergone significant elaboration and development ([15,16,29]). Different
formula-based contraction operators have been studied in the literature that are
classified into two families : the first one includes contraction operators that have
been defined in terms of remainder sets, i.e., maximal subsets of formulas that
fail to imply a given formula. From a dual point of view, the second family rep-
resents the Kernel contraction [18] which is based on the minimal sub-theories
implying the formula by which one contracts. Therefore, natural extension of
this work is to study the equivalence between formula-based revision operators
and their corresponding in the context of belief contraction (such as transitively
relational partial meet contraction, full meet contraction, maxichoice contraction
[1] and infra contraction [5]).
Besides, the work of Creignou et al. [9] defines PRSRG and PRSRW operators
as the extension respectively of RSRG and RSRW operators to stratified belief
bases. We remind that a stratified belief base B = (S1, ..., Sn) is provided by
a partition of the belief base in strata Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n) representing priorities
between formulas. It seems so natural to think in the future about the extension
of our operators (CRSG, CSRW and CSIR) to stratified belief bases. Finally,
future work can include also a thorough investigation of the complexity of these
new revision operators in the general case of propositional logic and in some
fragments (particularly Horn and Krom fragments).
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